Cuban Food is Made in Miami

Regardless of what you think of the US embargo, in 2024, it’s only hurting ordinary Cubans.

The other week I was in Miami for work. About 20 minutes before landing, I turned on the Skymap—the 2D map showing where the plane is on the globe in real-time. Because we were so close to our destination, the map view switched to a more zoomed-in screen of what was currently visible from the cabin. To the right was South Florida: Miami, Fort Lauderdale, Palm Beach and the rest. The first European to set eyes on Florida was the Spanish explorer Juan Ponce de León in 1513. The only reason I bring that up is because I once went to a masquerade party dressed as him.

On the Skymap’s horizon, several Cuban cities were visible beyond the Florida Straits. What a difference a small body of water makes. Since the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Cuba and the United States have been at war. Apart from a half-hearted US landing attempt in the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the warfare has been purely economic—in the form of sanctions largely excluding Cuba from the world economy. Unfortunately, regardless of what you think of the embargo, in 2024, it’s only hurting ordinary Cubans.

Cuba was a Spanish colony for over 400 years, from the arrival of Columbus until 1898 when the United States—hungry for sugar and A Place in the Sun—demanded the country become independent as part of the peace treaty in the Spanish-American War. The US directly acquired the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the Mariana Islands and Guam via the same agreement. During the first half of the 20th century, Cuba was firmly in the US sphere of influence, with American companies controlling the country’s major exports, utilities and railroads.

 In 1959, this exploitative arrangement was dissolved following Fidel Castro’s ascension to power, who two years later declared the country communist and founded the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). In response, the United States imposed a trade embargo against Cuba, remaining in effect today. The law prohibits US companies, firms organised under US law or majority-owned by American citizens from conducting trade with Cuba. In other words, the Cuban economy was shut out from global capitalism. The effects of the embargo were thus negligible as long as Cuba had economic and military backing from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. 

However, in the early 90s, both the US and capitalism became hegemonic. For Cuba, the fall of the USSR led to a deep economic crisis; GDP declined 35% between 1989 and 1993 (more statistics are available for those interested). To make matters worse for Cuba, the US decided to take advantage of its newly acquired unipolar position in the world, tightening its embargo through the Helms-Burton Act of 1996—extending sanctions to non-US firms doing business with Cuba. The economy did eventually stabilise, not least thanks to Venezuela, which subsidises Cuba’s economy by selling it cheap oil in exchange for medical and other expert services. Cuba has not really recovered, though. For example, industrial output, exports, and real wages have never again reached 1989 levels.

Which brings us to the present. Cuba is experiencing an economic crisis more severe than the one following the USSR’s collapse. The government reported that inflation hit 30% by the end of 2023, but experts estimate it to be much higher. In late February (2024), Cuba, for the first time, requested assistance from the World Food Programme to help provide powdered milk to children under the age of seven. There have also been reported problems with the distribution of basic foodstuffs for the country’s “supplies booklet”—a basket of basic food rationed to the population since 1962 and the pride of pro-PCC academics. The state-owned publication Granma said chicken and coffee were unavailable for five months in 2023 due to lower imports and declining production. The distribution of beef, soy, yoghurt, and even cooking oil, was also heavily impacted. Most of the limited available food is sold at exorbitant prices in private grocery stores known locally as “mipymes”. I guess some market segments are more centrally planned than others.

This humanitarian catastrophe has resulted in record-level migration. It is estimated that over 400,000 people—some 4% of the population—left Cuba between 2022–2023, including several of my family members. The numbers are worse than they seem, as it’s mainly young people who are leaving the country.

One cannot help but compare the food scarcity in Cuba to the situation across the Florida Straits, where Cuban cuisine is abundant and popular. Whether it be the Cuban sandwich, ham croquettes, or Vaca Frita, Cuban food is a staple in South Florida. It’s a travesty that people living in Cuba are deprived of the ingredients to cook their classic foods. In the face of widespread economic collapse, this might seem trivial. But the embargo has many faces. As usual, it’s ordinary people who pay the highest price. 

It’s important to note that the primary aim of sanctions is to pressure an economy to induce regime change, not inflict maximum hardship on civilian populations. Per the Helms-Burton Act, the law includes a set of provisions “to facilitate a peaceful transition to representative democracy and a market economy in Cuba and to consolidate democracy in Cuba.” In this sense, the US embargo against Cuba has been a complete failure. The same can be said for other sanction regimes, too. In his seminal study, Rodríguez shows that American and EU sanctions across the globe have negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, and human rights. As for regime change, Putin is still in the Kremlin, Kim Jong-un still controls North Korea’s nuclear weapons, Iran is still an Islamic Republic, Maduro governs Venezuela, and, last but not least, the Cuban Communist Party remains in power. 

In fact, the Cuban regime has used the embargo to tighten its political and economic grip on power. Cuba had to introduce austerity and limited privatisation measures to stabilise the economy following the Soviet Union’s demise. These reforms were framed as the only way to secure the long-term survival of the Cuban Revolution—a pragmatic approach encapsulated by a sign that stood over the entrance of the Carlos III shopping mall in Central Havana: “In the New Millennium, Sales + Economy + Efficiency = Revolution.” In the early 2000s, there was also a concerted effort to rebrand Cuba’s ideological identity from being a part of the now-collapsed communist world to emphasising local heritage and notions of national sovereignty. In other words, the survival of the revolution requires the survival of the state. Or, rather—the survival of the elites running the state.

This tiny elite has enriched itself on the back of the embargo by controlling tourism, the flow of US Dollars and access to the private sector. Cuba’s Armed Forces—through the company GAESA—controls the country’s tourism industry, a sector worth billions of dollars. GAESA also takes a cut of remittances sent to Cuba. It has been estimated that Cubans living abroad have sent over $52 billion in cash (and another $50 billion worth of goods) to the country since 1993. Research shows that for every $1 of remittances sent via Western Union and later spent in GAESA-owned grocery shops, the military gains 74 cents—with 61 cents coming directly from store sales. There is evidence that profits in the billions from tourism and remittance flows are laundered through the construction of hotels and other facilities in Cuba, managed by companies incorporated in tax havens. Then there are the aforementioned mipymes (small- and medium-sized enterprises), licences for which are given in bulk to allies or relatives of military and party officials.

These are vast sums of money. And whatever is done with it, ordinary Cubans reap no benefits. My favourite example of this communal spirit is Cuba in May 2021 importing chicken from Brazil and the United States (?) for $1–$1.48/kg and selling it for $7.58/kg in Havana. The Cuban regime has also become growingly repressive; Human Rights Watch reports that the number of arbitrary short-term detentions has increased dramatically since 2010.

The US embargo has severely impacted Cuban development and limited the options available to the regime. To claim otherwise would be disingenuous. But it does not excuse the elite-dominated, repressive system currently in place. The embargo is thus not only failing to spur regime change, it’s helping to sustain a predatory government. Does this mean the US should lift sanctions? Maybe. One thing is for certain. If you want a Cuban sandwich in all its lard-infused, cheesy, meaty, pickley glory, you’ll find one in Miami, not Havana. That, I think, is a shame.

// Adrian